War, Theory and the "Theory of War"
The Iran-Iraq war is one of those rapid political events which regardless of its objective consequences and effects, is also of significance from this respect that it puts to test the firmness of theory, and the truth and solidity of the tactical bases of our communist movement. With the Iran-Iraq war, a war which has impressed deep effects on the conditions of existence and struggle of the classes in society, the "peaceful" course of of the communist movement of Iran is subjected to agitation. The continuous and more or less progressive course of rejection of opportunism from the ranks of the communist movement, which manifested itself in such instances as the rejection of the opportunist majority of the central committee of the Organisation of People’s Fedayeen by its revolutionary minority, the strengthening of a left faction in the Organisation of Peykar, the gradual revealing of Rah-e-Karqar's Majority like tendencies and the relative clarification of the right-wing content of Razmandegan's left phrase-mongering, have now come up against a decisive interruption. It is decisive, not because the new conditions have necessarily provided, from the objective aspect favourable grounds for the re-emergence of opportunism, but since, firstly, the few and non-established -though nevertheless, precious and vital- theoretical gains of the movement are in jeopardy, and secondly, the old deviations change form, extend beyond organisational boundaries and manifest themselves in new forms, and mainly in two forms of returning to the origin: return to petty-bourgeois nationalism,on the one hand, and anarcho-pacifism based on theoretical formalism and stereotypism, on the other hand.
It Is natural that one regards the growth and development of consciousness as the criterion for the growth and development of a movement which wants to and must be the conscious leader of the proletariat. The quantitative extension of the communist movement, in the various fields of numbers, organisation, technique, finance, propaganda etc., is undoubtedly the vital need and necessary condition for the performance of the role which this movement, has undertaken for the ending of the shameful life of capitalism. But all these acquire their real place in the course of development of the proletarian movement, only when Leninist programme and tactics set them in motion and determine the direction of their activity. The history of the communist movement is full of examples of the rapid break up of the most extensive facilities and organisation, because of the domination of opportunist policy in them, or conversely the rapid growth and extension of facilities and organisation of the truly communist currents in a very short period. Without programmatic and tactical gains, there can be no organisational gains and without proletarian theory no body would be moved in the service of the proletariat. But the course of development of Marxist-Leninist consciousness is also itself in turn a course in which every theoretical gain, and every programmatic and tactical guideline which we build upon this theory, must be consolidated and preserved; otherwise, i.e., if our advancement is not based on the step by-step consolidation of gains, if the links of the growth and development are not completed one by one and at every step, then the first unexpected strike can send us back not a link, not a step, but tens of steps a as far back as the starting-point.
The deviationist tactics of the major section of the communist movement on the Iran-Iraq war are an undeniable witness to the profound carelessness which our movement has displayed on the question of theory, and the necessary course of development and consolidation of its gains. Theoretical carelessness, not because the movement has not dealt with theory, but because in this attempt either the achievement of the principles of Leninist programme and tactics has basically not been aimed for, or the course of formation of theory into a guide for action has been followed so slowly and at snail's pace that today, nearly two years after the uprising, when the Iran - Iraq war is inquiring after our theoretical state, we have nothing to offer. Two deviationist positions have today been posed in the movement on the question of the Iran-Iraq war. First, social-chauvinism and petty-bourgeois patriotism and second, anarcho-pacifism, or the po1icy of in-difference in the form of revolutionary phrases based on the necessity of transforming the Iran - Iraq war into an uprising and a revolutionary civil war; the theoretical carelessness dominant in the movement can be seen clearly in both fields, though to varying degrees:
1) The first case, is the position which Rah-e-Kargar and Razmandegan have adopted (since we are here polemicizing with communists, we do not concern ourselves with the "Majority"). Here it is not even a question of why these comrades have not been able to formulate their one-and-a-half year "theoretical endeavour"
in the form of programmatic and tactical principles so that it would protect their medium, populist radicalism and save them from sudden and involuntary dive into the lap of clear petty-bourgeois politics. The discussion is on the fact that the chauvinist deviation has basically seized upon those currents which were never able to treat socialism as a science, currents which have attempted to go beyond Marx, Engels and Lenin, be innovative and in one word "fabricate for themselves". Rah-e-Kargar is the symbol of such an attitude to scientific socialism and Razmandegan suffers, in this respect, from some of Rah-e-Kargar's streaks. What their theoretical achievement was at the time of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, [included] eclectic, self-invented and inevitably wavering tenets. When the Iran- Iraq war inevitably rubbed off from their face the self-content smile until further notice, and drew them to seek a thread, [or] a policy and a guideline for declaring a quick position, their only levering point became not the positions which they had achieved [so far], but the positions which they had not yet lost. They "returned to the origin" and involuntarily re-awakened in themselves the sleeping (one must say half - asleep) spirit of populism and petty-bourgeois nationalism: suddenly jumped over tens of steps, which they at least claimed to have advanced, and returned to the same populist revolutionary sentiments which Iranian communism has inevitably arisen from. But these sentiments, however courageous and humanitarian, are still populist sentiments, and those who have substituted them for the science of the struggle of one class, will proceed, by stirring up their sentiments, so far as turning into the most self-sacrificing and courageous patriots. That the social-chauvinist deviation, is not only based on the vacuum of the principles of Leninist programme and tactics, but also on the complete absence of Marxist theory in general, there is no need to dwell on any further.
2) But the case of anarcho - pacifism is a different matter. This specific deviation which the Organisation of Peykar represents, insistently gets the "theory" involved, but this is not the theory of Marxism which demands concrete ana1ysis of the concrete conditions, but a metamorphosis of Marxism and its conversion into stereotypism. A collection of tactical tenets and positions which have been arbitrarily presented in abstraction from the existing difference between the circumstances in which those tenets and positions were posed and adopted, and the concrete circumstances of our present day. Peykar's formalism lies in the fact that instead of placing the theory of Marxism in the service of the analysis of concrete objective conditions which have made the war necessary and obligatory, it starts from the entity of war, as an observation, and in the theory seeks for the relevant "chapter" on the war, so that it can immediately extract from it, its practical guidelines. How is it that on the attitude to the war, one who has deafened the world with the cry of "war is the continuation of politics", seeks his theory only in the debates of the "predecessors" on "war"? Should not the position of the proletariat on the war also be the continuation of the proletariats position on the policy which this war is the violent form of the continuation of? And if this is so, will the "relevant" theory for the comprehension of this policy, still be the theory of "imperialist wars"?! Had the "predecessors" themselves done so? Had they not, for the purpose of comprehending and adopting a proletarian position on the imperialist war, initially understood the economy of the era of imperialism and the policy based on this economy, and took position against it? How is it that an organisation which before the war did not even pose the slogan of overthrow, today with the occurrence of the war between the two bourgeoisies, which in the opinion of Peykar comrades stems from difference in interests independent of the Iranian revolution suddenly has not only seen the time right to pose the slogan of overthrow, but goes as far as to call for the overthrow [of the regime]? Which theory is this that regards the War as the continuation of politics, but only for the bourgeoisie? Should not the "just" civil war of the proletariat be also the continuation of its policy, and if this is so, are the necessary objective and subjective conditions ready today for this policy to be also pursued in a violent manner? Why did not Peykar refer, for adopting position, to for instance this theoretical tenet of the great men "never play with an insurrection"? Is not the humanitarian Peykar so humanitarian to realize that a defeated uprising or civil war, without the party, without the independent rank and leadership of the proletariat, without programme and without all the requirements for resorting to violent action to seize the political power, will turn the proletariat and all its hitherto acquired limited gains into the "cannon fodder" of the counter-revolution and will [also] turn its "skin, flesh and bones” into materials for the organisation of a new period of capital accumulation? These are all theoretical questions that Peykar could refer, by the very same formalistic manner, to their concerned chapter, "the chapter on the theory of uprising", "the chapter on the theory of crisis", "the chapter on programme and tactics", etc., in the books of gospel. But Peykar is more formalist to do so; it sees the war and so wants the theory of war. It chooses the theoretical questions governing its problem only by way of the form of the problem which it has before itself, and seeks in theory for lines in which there is a mention of this form. This is nothing but sticking to the letter of theory and inevitably jumping over its method and content!
But what is the real place of theory in the determination of the question of war?
1) Theory must be able to analyze the necessity of war. Apparently all those who repeat day and night the phrase "war is the continuation of politics...” also have this objective. But we shall show later how, what is not at all considered in the examinations by the patriotists and the anarcho-pacifists is the Marxist meaning of "necessity". What we mean by the explanation of the necessity of war, is the explanation and analysis of its place in the lawful course of the collection of definite relations of production and class relations which this war has taken form in the context of and in relation to the needs of their transformation and development. Here is the middle-east, the Gulf region, a region where the monopoly capital under the leadership of American imperialism had established, until before the Iranian revolution, definite relations with the proletariat of the countries in the region (and thereby with the non-proletarian toilers); relations which held within the framework of the imperialist division of the world their specific place and meaning, and constituted one of the world conditions for the production and reproduction of imperialist relations of production (until before the start of a new and probable attempt for the re-division of the world). Here, in this region and in the most important dominated country of the Gulf (both economically and politically), a revolution is in progress which has threatened these relations together with their internal imperialist balance and equilibrium, and its continuation will throw the imperialist economy and policy into the abyss of crisis, not only in Iran but in the whole of the middle-east. Here the proletariat has definite ideals, aims and possibilities and the monopoly capital is likewise looking for the creation and revival of definite economic and political conditions. Here a definite line up, because of the progress of Iranian revolution, has come to exist between the two camps of revolution and counter-revolution over definite questions, etc... To explain the necessity of war is to analyze its place in the course of development of these relations of production and class relations and class conflicts. Who can consider a war in this definite juncture between classes (as many classes as there may be) in the context of this collection of relationships without analysing economy and politics with respect to the position of the two main antagonistic classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? Which classical text on war can provide immediately and directly a practical guidance without it being linked up, by the contemplation, thinking and cognition of today communists, to the concrete analysis of the concrete conditions of today and of here? Yes, war is the continuation at politics by violent means, but the policy of classes itself originate from their position in production and their reactions, as the human reflection of definite productive positions, in relation to the necessary laws of movement and development of the relations of production; and if we do not see the latter, we will not understand the necessity of war, because we would not have understood the necessity of the emergence of the policy which the war is the violent continuation of. We shall return to this point later.
2) theory must explain the "possibility of war" i.e., the objective economic and political conditions on which the war is based for its emergence and continuation. Theory must explain the point that which economic and political (and military) conditions realise the violent continuation of politics in the form of war between two definite countries. Theory must explain why the war between these two definite countries can be one of the forms of the violent continuation ofthe policy of classes, and on this basis must recognise, firstly the possibility of the transformation of war into other forms, secondly the probable course of its extension and continuation, and thirdly, the economic and political conditions for its ending. With regard to the existing economic and political conditions, can the start and continuation of this war basically meet the necessities and requirements which brought it about? For this purpose, until when and until the creation of which definite changes must the war continue? Is this definite war able to create these changes? If not, in what other forms will the violent continuation of the policy which caused this war, be pursued? Is the defeat or victory of the warring sides, necessarily tantamount to the defeat or the victory of the policy which caused the war?...
3) Theory must, in the next step, go beyond the analysis of the fundamental necessity and practical possibility of war and examine the class desirability of the war (desirability for definite class). Since the hasty interpreters of the statement "war is the continuation of politics..." have precisely mistaken the category of the "class desirability of war" for the question of the "necessity of war", it is necessary that we positively explain this question to some extent.
So far as we are talking about the necessity and possibility of war, we have in view, the existing objective laws and conditions prevailing in the society and outside the mind of human beings. But when we talk about the war itself as an actual reality, human beings and their class mentality and consciousness are completely involved. the necessity and possibility of war are categories which are related to the objective and economic laws of movement of societies and the economic and political characteristics of countries in a definite historical juncture. But classes are the human reflection of these economic relations and hence they formulate and define as their "particular interests aid objectives", at this or that definite juncture, that which sets them in motion in the actual fact, as laws independent of their will; and by defining and adopting a practice (cultural, political, military, etc...) for the achievement of these objectives and interests, they advance in practice, by their conscious interference and movement, the development of social relationships and class relations. These particular objectives are undoubtedly followed within the limits which the laws (necessities) and objective possibilities are imposing on them, but [these objectives] do not completely coincide with them since the particular interests and objectives of classes are the expression of the objective necessities of the transformation of social relationships from the viewpoint of a definite class-consciousness:
"The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformation it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural sciences, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."
(Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)
In Other words, revolution is the result of the sharpening of the antagonism between the development of productive forces and the relations of production which have become a barrier in its development, this is the necessity of revolution, but one would never find some one who participated in the revolution by the slogan of "the way for the development of productive forces must be cleared";(of course there are people who shirk from revolution by this slogan). For instance a classical bourgeois revolution becomes a necessity on account of its role in facilitating the development of the productive forces, but none of the social strata and classes take part in the revolution or become attracted to it with this objective. They understand and picture the revolution, and hence its underlying contradictions, in the very forms which Marx has pointed out above. They want free trade, equality before the law, freedom of science from the clutches of religion, bread, the separation of religion from the state, parliament, the abolition of debts to the landowners, etc, and they do not even think about the "productive forces" and their antagonism with "the relations of production", but with this and that demand they cause a transformation which in the actual fact meets the necessity of revolution - the substructural contradiction of society - and paves the way for the development of the productive forces. The class desirability of wars or in other words the particular objectives and interests which are the reflection of the more general and fundamental necessities in the minds of definite classes, themselves necessarily have meaning at a superstructural level. To explain the war only by the "particular objectives" of the warring sides is nothing else but reducing politics to diplomacy and "foreign
policy", whilst war and diplomacy are both the continuation of policy. All of what our patriots and anarcho-pacifists have presented so far in the name of theoretical analysis of the Iran-Iraq war is nothing but journeying at this very superstructural level, at the level of desirability or non-desirability of war for this or that definite class: "the Iraqi bourgeoisie wants this, and the Iranian bourgeoisie wants that", "the proletariat of Iran and Iraq have no interest in the war", or "it is to the advantage of the Iranian proletariat to stand up against Iraq" etc. The policy which the Iran-Iraq war is the continuation of, has no other meaning for these distorters of Leninist tenets, but listing the "demands" of classes from the war. The proletariat's tactics is also extracted from this very level of "desirability and demands": "A war has broken out whose reasons are independent of the class struggle in Iran, now let us see what are the interests of the proletariat, the desirable situation for the proletariat, in this war"? Answer this question and you will have found the proletarian tactic!!
There is no doubt that the explanation of the class desirability of a war is the in separable part of any Marxist analysis, but limiting analysis to this level, will have no outcome but judging the bourgeoisie on the basis of what it says about itself, and inevitably losing hold of the power of Marxist theoretical analysis of the necessities and laws dominant over the movement of classes, and thereby complete detachment from the theory in the posing and adoption of tactics.
But that theory which in examining the Iran-Iraq war is able to reveal the necessity, possibility and class desirability of the war, must inevitably answer or must have answered in the first place, questions which were confronting the communist and wor1cers' movement even before the start of the war. If the explanation of the necessity of war requires the analysis of the fundamental relations between labour and capital in Iran and in the region and its concrete developments, it is evident that the "Iranian revolution", as the most fundamental and determining factor in the course of transformation of these relations during the last few years, must form the axis of this theoretical analysis. If we do not wish to start, as Peykar does, from the level of the class desirability of the war, and begin the analysis with the biographies of the Iranian and Iraqi bourgeoisies, and with the desires, wishes and hostilities which these two bourgeoisie "have always had" and today they have found external manifestation "out of the blue", i.e., if we want to think in a Marxist way and hold to the belief that social events, including the war between two bourgeoisies, do not happen accidentally or arbitrarily, and from the historical viewpoint every "self-consistent" class wish or desire acquires the possibility of realization only when the fundamental necessities of the movement of society and production and class relations have made its realization necessary and possible; and in short, if we start in the analysis of Iran-Iraq war from the relations of labour and capital and their concrete changes, conditions and circumstances, then we shall have no alternative but to recognise the analysis of the war as the continuation of our analysis of the imperialist capitalism in Iran and in the region and the impacts of the Iranian revolution on the latter. Therefore, if a vast section of the communist movement wrongly examines the question of war and the proletarian tactics against it, in isolation from its theory and its programmatic and tactical positions on the Iranian revolution, we must emphasise that due to the determining significance of the Iranian revolution in the course of development of the imperialist relations of labour and capital in Iran and in the region, the taking of position on the war must inevitably be based on, and coincide with, our theory, programmatic positions and tactical policy on the, Iranian revolution.
It is here that we arrive at the point which we mentioned at the beginning of the discussion: the tactics of a major section of the communist movement on the question of war, reveal the considerable negligence which the movement has suffered from in the field of turning theory into the principles of programme and tactics. The communist movement poses and adopts its tactics on the political questions, including the present war, which are posed one after the other independently of its will, mainly in a disconnected manner and in isolation from a definite tactical policy which should be based on the concrete analysis of the society and the Iranian revolution, and on its definite programme for it. So long as it is so, there will be no escape from tactical deviations and, more importantly, from the appearance of these deviations in various forms.
In our opinion, the tactical policy which the Marxist analysis of the conditions of the society, the revolution and its aims makes necessary and principled is the policy of "defending the revolution and preserving its continuation". In different articles and pamphlets, by examining the fundamental features of Iranian capitalism, the nature and content of the present revolution, and the course of development of the two camps of revolution and counter-revolution, we have argued in defence of this policy. thus:
Firstly, the Democratic revolution of Iran must provide the specific economic and political preconditions for the ultimate move of the proletariat towards socialism. These preconditions and gains must be created, preserved, and extended, and all these will depend on the ability of the independent power of the proletariat in the organisation and leading of the defence of these gains. The victory of the present revolution means that the proletariat would be able to facilitate and speed up "from above" the process of creation of these economic and political preconditions and gains. the accomplishment of this matter itself necessitates the resolute defence of the gains of the half-finished February uprising and the extension of these gains for the purpose of providing the necessary objective and subjective conditions for another uprising which must become victorious under the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat. So long as the necessary objective and subjective conditions for this victorious uprising (as a link in the class struggle of the proletariat) have not been provided, the defence of the revolution in the above general sense will be the general tactical policy of the proletariat. In other words, the programme of the proletariat in the present revolution, based on the concrete analysis of the concrete post-February uprising conditions, has determined that general string which links up the tactics of communists during this period.
Secondly, the concrete analysis of Iranian capitalism, has revealed the inevitability of the violent assault of the bourgeoisie and imperialism on the revolution and the proletariat, in different forms and under the leadership of the different political currents of the Iranian bourgeoisie (whether in the government or in the opposition) or even [the leadership of] the imperialist bourgeoisie in general. The "defence of the revolution", in the sense of organising mass resistance under the leadership of the proletariat against this inevitable assault, is placed on the agenda of the revolutionary proletariat also in the strict sense of the word and constitutes one of the determining principles of its tactical policy. This is the point which links up the political debates, from the very morrow of the February uprising against the Islamic Republic regime, which for a long time was the main factor of the assault of the counter-revolution, to also the debate on the coup-d'etat of the imperialist opposition and now to the debate on the Iran-Iraq war.
And thirdly, until such time when the necessary objective and subjective conditions for an uprising under the leadership of the proletariat and the establishment of a revolutionary government have not been provided, i.e., until such time when the defence of the revolution and the preservation and extension of its gains must necessarily be carried out from below, and not from both above and below the prevention of the consolidation of the present counter-revolutionary government of the bourgeoisie and the unification of the ranks of the bourgeoisie, is one of the determining principles of the tactical policy of the proletariat. Hence, the defence of the revolution can not and must not be taken as equivalent to the defence of the government or a faction of the bourgeoisie whether in theory or in practice. Hence, the defence of the revolution also carries this implication that the proletariat will resist against and decisively suppress all the attempts to which the bourgeoisie resorts, in different forms, and every day in more violent manner, for the establishment of the hegemony of the monopoly capital in the ranks of the bourgeoisies.
This is why we believe that since after the February uprising up to now and until such time when, because of the objective and subjective conditions, the offensive for the seizure of political power has not been placed on the agenda, the defence of the revolution and its continuation, as the tactical policy of the proletariat, has proved itself as principled, independently of the present war or any other actual assault of the counter-revolution. Only a petty-bourgeois tied in phrases, or any one who still identities the. Islamic Republic regime with the "revolution", can regard the policy of "defending the revolution against the war of the capitalists" as defencism against Iraq. The critics of the policy of defending the revolution against the war, must specifically show that now such objective and subjective conditions are ready that the proletariat's policy must be turned into the policy of offensive for the seizure of power. Otherwise, the slogan of turning the war into civil war and uprising, etc., will be no more than anarchist declamations.
The task that this specific war places before the proletariat, is the determination of such a definite tactic which pursues its tactical policy, under the new conditions, in the best possible way. The important point here is the determination of those definite forms with which the revolution has been assaulted by the war in general and by the operations of the two regimes of Iran and Iraq in particular. Forms which the confrontation of the proletariat with them not only repels the assault of the bourgeoisie, but also advances the cause of organisation and promotion of the consciousness of the proletariat, which is the necessary condition for approaching towards the political power.
Today, the tactical confusion of the communist movement has revealed, more than before, the absence of a proletarian tactical policy, and this itself originates, in turn, from the lack of a clear communist programme in the present revolution and of a concrete analysis of the post-uprising conditions. The virtue of the war has been to make this vacuum glaringly obvious. The practical outcomes of the deviating tactics, i.e., the strengthening of the Islamic Republic regime by the social-chauvinists and the playing into the hands of the imperialist opposition by the anarcho-pacifists, and inevitably the sending of the proletariat behind the bourgeoisie on both sides, will be so deplorable as to draw the communist movement to the objective criticism of its theoretical carelessness, and its inattention to the principles of proletarian programme and tactics. The positive point is that the elements of this criticism have already been provided in the positions and debates inside the communist movement over the question of war.
Extracted from Besooy-e-Sosyalism (Towards Socialism) No. 3, October 1980
 "Worker’s Path"- Ed.
 i.e, the section of the Organisation of People's Fedayeen which split in July 1980 and has been an active supporter of the Islamic Republic regime- Ed.
1- The Student Supporters of the Unity of Communist Militants - Britain accepts full responsibility for the translations of the works of the Unity of Communist Militants.
2- The programme of the U.C.M., Published in English in March 1982, is in reality issue No. 2 of the present translation series. Unfortunately this fact was not indicated on the cover of the work at the time of publication.
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Student Supporters of the 'Unity of Communist Militants' - Britain.
WORKS OF THE UNITY OF COMMUNIST MILITANTS
1- The Iranian Revolution and the Role of the Proletariat (Theses). November/December 1978.
2- The Invasion of the Iraqi Regime and Our Tasks. (September. 1980).
3- Manifesto of the U.C.M. (what it says, and what political system it is fighting for in the present situation)* (February 1981).
4- Programme of the U.C.M.** (March 1981).
5- The 1st of May and the Tasks of the Iranian Workers* (May 1981).
6- Manifesto of the U.C.M. About the "Present Situation, its Perspectives and the Tasks of the Communists"* (June 1981).
7- The Content of the Victory of the Democratic Revolution of Iran (July/August 1980).
8- The Myth of the National and Regressive Bourgeoisie (NO.1) (May 1979).
9- The Myth of the National and Progressive Bourgeoisie (No.2) (April 1980).
10- Populism in the Minimum Programmes: A Critique of 'What the Fedaeen-e-Khalgh Say" (January 1981).
11- Some Leaflets.**
To be Published
1- Social-Chauvinism, Razmandegan Under the Banner of Kar 59 (October 1980).
2- Anarcho-Pacifism, Peykar with the Wooden Sword. (October 1980).
3- The Explanation of the Manifesto "The Invasion of the Iraqi Regime and our Tasks" (October 1980).
4- The Prospect of Destitution and the Re-Escalation of Revolution. (Its supplement on the Marxist theory of crisis) (February 1980).
5- Two Factions Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution (Parts 1,2 and 3) (January 1980).
6- Three Sources and Three Component Parts of the Popular Socialism of Iran (October 1980).
7- Communists and the peasant Movement, after the Imperialist Solution of the Agrarian Question in Iran (March 1980).
* Also available in French.
+ Also available in German.
The above Publications are also available from:
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- Postlagerkarte Nr. 055266 B. 1000 Berlin 120, W.Germany.
- Box 7078. 17107 Solna, Sweden.
- UCM Box 212. 2265 Westwood Blvd., Suite B, Los Angeles. CA 90064. USA